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THE WAR ADJUSTMENT PROBLEM
CECL E. Ft.-sEE*
As we enter the third year of our war effort, our military leaders are preparing
for invasion of western Europe. Almost daily our newspapers report heavy bomb-
ing operations over Germany and her occupied territories to destroy strategic pro-
duction areas and to prepare the way for mass invasion. The President has sub-
mitted his second hundred-billion-dollar war budget and has raised the question
of the advisability of a universal service act to meet serious labor shortages in
critical areas of our war production program.
After the conference between Stalin, Churchill, and Roosevelt, and their military,
naval, and diplomatic representatives, we were warned that our most important
effort still lies ahead of us. We have not yet driven the Nazis out of Italy or
secured a foothold on the west coast of Europe, nor have we begun our heaviest
operations against Japan. Our military leaders warn us against the dangers of
wishful thinking that there will be a collapse in Gerinany or Japan in the imme-
diate future and tell us that we must expect heavier casualty lists and occasional
reverses as our military and naval forces increase the size and intensity of their
attack. We must continue to increase our war production, for our forces and the
forces of the United Nations are still short of needed equipment. Furthermore, in
our attack, as already demonstrated in North Africa, tanks, trucks, planes, and
guns worn out through use must be replaced just as surely as those hit by bomb or
shell fire.
Immediate Transition Period
And yet in this third year of our war effort we are faced with the fact that
some of our war factories are being closed. In some areas war workers are being
thrown out of jobs and apparently are unable to find other jobs quickly. There
are threats of strikes, not for more pay, but for more war work. Stockpiles of
aluminum, brass, copper, and zinc are reported to be building up.
As early as October of last year, Under-Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson
testified before a Congressional committee that, of io,ooo cases of cancellation or
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termination of war contracts, some 3,000 had not yet been settled. He stated that
the procedure had not been so swift as it should be because the problem was new
and it took time to train people in the operation of such procedures.'
Early Postwar Planning
Realizing that they would have a serious unemployment problem if war con-
tracts should suddenly cease at the close of hostilities, many cities have developed
postwar committees, usually working in close cooperation with local chambers
of commerce. In most of the states, postwar commissions have also been appointed
by the governors to study the problem and to make plans to prevent postwar unem-
ployment.2 Much of this planning has been realistic, but it is only natural that,
in the main, most of the publicity has been given to the major steps to be taken
in the postwar period rather than to immediate problems of war adjustment.
Government officials in Washington have for the most part emphasized that
there would be three major periods in which readjustment would take place: first,
after the defeat of Germany, which it was hoped might take place in the summer
or fall of 1944; second, after the defeat of Japan, which it was hoped might take
place by the summer or fall of 1945; and third, after the Army of Occupation had
been substantially reduced and the peoples of occupied countries would no longer
require food, clothing, and other supplies as a gift or loan in order to exist.
By late summer of 1943, many branches of the Army and Navy had set up
what amounted to planning Sections to study the problems of demobilization. The
civilian war agencies and Government departments likewise began to set up sections
to work on this problem. Generally speaking, such activities were highly secret.
The Army and Navy, as well as Government officials, trying to increase war
production, feared that the talk of postwar planning would lead to overconfidence
on the part of the public. It was feared that businessmen in planning a recon-
version to peacetime poduction would slacken their war effort, and such slackening
in turn might result in prolonging the war and costing more lives. It was recog-
nized that postwar planning now was necessary, but it was believed it should be
done quietly by small groups.
Fear of Axis Propaganda
Emphasis was placed on increased production of essential war materials, the
drafting of fathers to meet the requirements of our Armed Services, the develop-
ment of morale on the home front to induce the public to buy more bonds, the
stamping out of black markets in rationed foods, and the acceptance with good
grace of shortages of tires, electric flatirons, and various items of household equip-
'Hearings before the Select Committee to Conduct a Study and Investigation of the National
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ment that would continue for some time to come. This point of view was perhaps
heightened by the manner in which Axis officials made effective propaganda out
of the coal shortage resulting from the strike of the miners the threatened strike
of the railroads which led temporarily to the taking over of the roads by the
Government, and the public criticism of OPA, WPB, and other Government
agencies.
We can perhaps visualize more clearly the effect of such propaganda if we con-
sider what our own reactions would be if these situations had developed in Ger-
many. What would be our own reaction if the German coal miners had struck
during a critical period of the war effort; if the German railroads had threatened
to go on strike; and if almost every German newspaper to a greater or lesser degree
carried stories of black market operations and voiced opposition on the part of
even loyal Nazis to food rationing laid down by the German equivalent of the
OPA? If we would view with satisfaction such developments in Germany, we
can imagine the delight with which Axis propagandists sieze on such stories from
America.
When information of developments in this country have been used by skillful
German propagandists to increase the morale of our enemies and to lower the
morale of the underground sabotage activities of conquered peoples, and when
even the men in our own Armed Forces facing the privations and casualties of
fighting a war on worldwide fronts feel that at times the home front is not giving
them the proper support, it is only natural that our military and Government offi-
cials have hesitated to give publicity to postwar planning or to do anything that
might detract from our first job of winning the war. The very term "postwar
planning" is to many people a dilatory phrase dealing with something that' is in
the distant future.
Necessity for Transition Planning
But the time has come when, despite these objections, we must plan for the
transition and postwar period. Many Government agencies have for some time
been taking definite steps in this direction. Many of these transition problems are
not waiting for V-Day. The public, as well as our enemies, are well aware of the
termination or cancellation of thousands of contracts, the closing of some of our
war plants, and the pressure for releasing excess materials for civilian needs. These
are the problems that we face now and will continue to face in increasing numbers
as the war progresses.
In fact, the more effective and far-sighted our military leaders, Government offi-
cials, and businessmen have been in building up sufficient stocks of ammunition,
tanks, and other equipment to assure that there is no shortage of such essential
items, the more rapidly we are faced with transition problems. Where' the saving
of human lives is the important yardstick of our endeavors, we must not only
have enough but a surplus of the tools of war, so that, if there is a sudden
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change in our requirements, our Armed Forces do not face the shortages that led
to the heartbreaking termination of our struggle on Bataan and the delay of our
advance in Italy because of the lack of proper landing equipment.
Other changes in military requirements are the result of new inventions and
improved designs of equipment. Some of these changes have been forced on us
by new methods of attack and defense developed by the Axis. Still other changes
in the needs of our fighting men come from a change in geography-our require-
ments for the rugged country encountered in the Italian campaign are different
from our requirements in North Africa. In war there is no second best; there is only
victory or defeat. To assure that victory, constant change to meet new conditions
is required, and constant change often means the termination or cancellation of
contracts.
Important Problems of Transition
The termination or cancellation of contracts raises the question not only of
prompt payment of a substantial portion of the contractors' claims, but of how
the manpower and facilities that are released can be shifted to the manufacture of
-- those items still necessary in the war effort, or to the manufacutre of products
necessary for civilian needs.
This problem resolves itself into a number of important questions. What
factories can be released from war work? Which communities will be affected?
Are large plants or small plants to be converted first? Should some plants, even
though closed,, stand by to take up production of the same war materials again
in the event that additional reserves are needed? Can manpower be used in the
manufacture of civilian goods while there is still a serious shortage in planes,
landing barges, and other equipment? Will companies that can obtain sheet metal
for the manufacture of sporting goods and automobile luncheon cases be allowed
to make these items because they have available labor which can no longer be
used on war work? What will be the public attitude when people can obtain
luxuries but not necessities, and what will be the attitude of other manufacturers
who find that their requests for the same materials to manufacture refrigerators
or washing machines have been refused by Government agencies because they are
in a critical labor area.
If Nylon, for example, is to be released for women's hosiery, is it to be held
in a stockpile until all manufacturers of Nylon hosiery can start on an equal
basis, or are certain plants to be allowed to manufacture Nylon hosiery as soon
as even a small'amount of the raw material is released from military purposes?
Are brand names to be given any preference over unbranded merchandise? Is
one manufacturer to have the advantage of building up a tremendous civilian
business while his competitors are still engaged in war work? What is to be
done with the manufacturers of rayon hosiery, with the wholesalers, and with
department stores that have stocks of rayon hosiery on their shelves when the
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women suddenly find or even hear rumors that they may be able to buy Nylon
hosiery?
These problems of the transition are important, for the way in which they are
decided now will set the pattern for much of our postwar development. In fact,
it is to be hoped and expected that the solution of many of our problems and the
method of operation will be blocked out and under way before V-Day arrives.
Certainly if this can be done, much of the confusion will be avoided, the fears
of a long, drawn-out postwar adjustment can be at least partially allayed, and
the men who are discharged from the armed services may have at least some
opportunity to obtain a civilian job.
Magnitude of the Job
The over-all size of this problem can be visualized if we bear in mind ihe
following striking examples. The Government has expended $13 billions in
additional military establishments and has acquired land for war purposes in excess
of the total area of New England. Since the beginning of the war the Govern-
ment has expended 'over $i6 billions in new industrial plants, and private com-
panies have added $6Y2 billions to new plant capacity. Think of these figures in
terms of new facilities to be utilized in our peacetime program. The total invest-
ment in the entire American railroad system is reported to be about $25 billions-
in the automobile industry about $4!/2 billions. What do these facts mean in rela-
tion to our future civilian economy? 3
It is evident that our future civilian economy will be shaped materially for
years to come by the soundness of our plans for industrial demobilization. In-
creasing recognition of the need for careful thought about the problems of indus-
trial demobilization has developed in many quarters in recent months. In part
at least, this recognition has been associated with realization of the extent to which
industrial demobilization may occur before the formal end of the war. It is
becoming more and more evident that the steps to be taken in industrial demobili-
zation depend to a considerable extent on a clear understanding of the steps taken
to put our industrial mobilization program into effect.
Development of Industrial Mobilization
For some years prior to 1940 the armed services, through the Office of the Assist.
ant Secretary of War and the Army-Navy Munitions Board had been planning for
industrial mobilization in the event of war. These plans outlined the process
whereby in the event of war the industrial resources of the nation should be devoted
to the utmost extent possible to the prosecution of the war, including not only the
production of military end-items such as tanks, planes, guns, and ships, but also
the production of those things essential to maintaining the health of the civilian
population and keeping it functioning effectively in the war effort.
'Speech "The Challenge to American Business" by Donald K. David at the Second New England
War Conference, November 1g, 1943.
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In actual operation, these plans were modified by the fact that by June, 1940,
the nation was beginning to mobilize its resources of men, materials, and industrial
plants well before the actual declaration of war was forced on us in December,
1941, and hence before war powers made possible necessary action to put the plan
into effect in its entirety. The steps taken by industry and labor to develop our
outstanding production of munitions have been innumerable and in a very real
sense of overwhelming importance. On the Government side, two principal in-
struments have been used to accomplish industrial mobilization during the last
three years. One instrument has been positive in its action, the other negative.
The positive instrument has been the placing of a tremendous number of con.
tracts for the production of needed items, often on an entirely different basis from
that on which the relatively small contracts were placed in time of peace. For
military end-products and for raw materials the Government, often by negotiated
price, provided an assured market of several times the total production of many of
our industries. In other words, the Government assumed, for war purposes, what
is ordinarily the major risk of industry, the risk involved in finding a market and
holding it at least for a period. The Government, of course, also assumed other
risks, normally borne by business, perhaps the most notable of which is the capital
investment risk. Some 8o% of the capital investment required for war production
has involved the assumption of risk by the Government. In addition, working capi-
tal has often been provided by advance payments, loans and various other means.
The principal negative instrument for bringing about industrial mobilization has
been the group of output and input controls administered by the War Production
Board under the priority power, By these controls industry has been prevented
from making many things and limited in its output of many other things, thus
assuring in so far as possible a supply of raw materials for munitions and clearing
the way for the acceptance of war contracts without fear of too great competitive dis-
advantage in the civilian field.
Results of Industrial Mobilization
These two principal devices, aided and supplemented by a host of others which
may be disregarded for our main purpose, have brought about a very high degree
of industrial mobilization. In his testimony before the Appropriations Committee
of the House of Representatives on May 27, x943, Mr. Donald Nelson presented
the results of our industrial mobilization, stripped to their essentials, by introducing
the following brief table 4  BILLIONS ox DOLLRS
Gross National
Calendar Year Product War Non-war
1940 ............................ $97 $2 $95
1941 ..... ....................... 119 14 105
1942 ..... ....................... 152 52 100
1943 (est.) .................. . 8o 90 9o
'Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations on National War 4genciet
Appropriation Bill for 1944, 78th Cong., ist Sess. (May 27, 1943) xo62.
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The dollar value of the gross national product nearly doubled from 1940 to
1943 while the proportion devoted to war purposes rose from slightly more than
2% in 1940 to 50% in 1943. To put it another way, while the gross national product
devoted to non-war purposes remained nearly constant ($9o billions compared with
$95 billions) we erected an entirely new war economy practically as large as our
total in 1940.
Now let us move from internal comparisons as the measure of our industrial
mobilization to comparisons with the achievements of our enemies in this field.
In 1939 the Axis nations were producing about $12 billions worth of combat muni-
tions per year; the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States were pro-
ducing only about $2 billions worth. By 1941 the balance had shifted; Axis
production was probably slightly less than that in the Anti-Axis World. In 1942,
the tide was in full flow; the United Nations outproduced the Axis two to one.
In x943 production by the Allies exceeded that of the Axis by three to one and
in 1944 the forecast is for a margin of four to one.5 It is probable that the United
States alone is producing in excess of half the entire world output of combat muni-
tions, as compared with approximately 2% in x939. These then are the results of
industrial mobilization in the United States.
Conversion and Reconversion of Plants
One 6f the most dramatic aspects of industrial mobilization has been the "con-
version" or physical changing of plant facilities to make some new item, as, for
example, the shift from equipment to make refrigerators to equipment to make
machine guns. Although "conversion" is an important and necessary step in ob-
taining effective production of munitions, it is often overstressed.
As the Committee for Economic Development has pointed out, many more of
our workers are employed in activities where physical conversion has not taken
place than in activities where it has taken place.6 Including agriculture, the utili-
ties, wholesale and retail trade, a broad group of service industries, and a large part
of manufacturing covering such items as food, clothing, fuel, steel, lumber, and
cement, the C.E.D. estimates that 8o% of all civilians now employed are not
engaged in activities in which physical conversion has occurred, and consequently
no problems of physical reconversion will be involved.
In the manufacturing field alone, of course, the employment in physically con-
verted plants bulks larger in the total. But it is important to remember that the
process of industrial mobilization has been much broader than the process of physi-
cal conversion, and that the process of industrial demobilization will be "much broader
than the process of physical reconversion. We should not concentrate our attention
'Testifying before the Subcommittee on Contract Termination of the Senate Military Affairs Com-
mittee on Oct. 27, 1943, Mr. Randolph Paul of the Treasury Department put the gross national
product for the 1944 fiscal year (June '43-June '44) at $195 billion and war expenditures at $95
billion.
'S. Moaus LMvINGSTON, MAXETS AFTER THE WA (1943) 24, (prepared under direction of Bureau
of Foreign and Domestic Commerce) ; also in reprint, SEN. Doc. No. 40, 78th Cong., Ist Sess. (1943) 20.
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so strongly on the problems of those industries and companies which will be con-
fronted with the task of physical reconversion that we neglect entirely the problems
of those industries and companies which do not face important physical recon-
version. The latter, by and large, are the "bread and butter" industries on which
the bulk of employment depends.
Industrial Demobilization
In industrial demobilization when industrial effort is being shifted away from
war production to peace production, the great bulk of the task will rest on industry
and labor. There will no longer be a wartime economy superimposed on a some-
what reduced civilian economy. The Government will no longer provide an assured
market for the total production of many of our largest plants. Each company will
more or less be forced to work out its future salvation under its own direction. In
some instances the Government may furnish funds for reconversion,7 but in the
main the task of Government will be to pay claims promptly and to remove war-
time restrictions gradually and in an orderly fashion with whatever planning is
necessary to assure at least some degree of fairness on the road back.
As compared with industrial mobilization, the instruments used by the Gov-
ernment to guide industrial demobilization will in the main be negative. The
procurement agencies will stop placing all but small peacetime contracts and will
terminate unfinished contracts as rapidly as possible. The War Production Board,
or whatever agency is managing the controls over input and output under the
priority power, will relax or remove the prohibitions against the production of
various types of goods or the prohibitions against the use of materials for particu-
lar purposes. There will not be the positive instrument of Government contracts
for the production of the civilian goods, the assured demand offered by the Govern-
ment for war production."
The essence of the management of industrial demobilization on the part of the
Government lies in establishing sound procedures in contract cancellation and termi-
nation during the transition period. Prompt payment on old contracts and the
withholding of new ones should coincide with the lifting of controls over materials
and output of civilian products and be so balanced as to timing and as to the indus-
tries and companies affected that there will be a minimum of loss in the use of
productive resources, men, machines, and materials. Frequently war production
demands in other fields will prevent lifting restrictions or ultilizing manpower in
civilian production, but the extent to which we can achieve this goal in the transi-
'For a discussion of the extension of instruments now used for financing war contractors to post-
termination financing of those contractors, see CnARLEs CoRTEz ABorT and WALTER G. O'NEIL,
Ta V AND VT LoAN ARRANGEMENT AND TRMINATION FINANCING (Harvard Business School, Division
of Research, 1944).
"There will, of course, be many important exceptions to this observation. Government contracts
for non-war purposes (relief and rehabilitation, construction of needed public projects by Federal,
State, and local governments, and deferred maintenance of public property, for exmaple) will be
important throughout the demobilization period.
THE WAR ADJUSTMENT PRoBLEm 437
tion period will govern to a large extent the success of demobilization during the
period of industrial strain and stress at the end of the war.
Amount of Contract Terminations
We should have a clear perspective on the terminations of war production con-
tracts which are currently taking place. The President in his budget message
to Congress on January 13, 1944, announced that more than $12 billions of war con-
tracts had already been terminated. 9 This is well in excess of the volume terminated
at the end of the last war.
But such figures may be subject to misinterpretation for many War Depart-
ment terminations were partial terminations only. In the great bulk of cases, the
terminations were merely an incident to the placing of contracts for some other
war item. Figures are not available showing directly how many terminations were
tied to new contracts, but the fact that 70% of the terminations made by the War
Department through July 31, 1943, resulted in no claim against the Government
is significant.
The Efect of When the War Ends
We can usefully distinguish three stages in the possible termination of our war
effort without any attempt to assume dates or time periods; the Global War Stage,
extending from now to the end of the war in Europe; the Pacific War Stage, ex-
tending from the end of the war in Europe to the end of the war in the Pacific,
and the Peace Stage, following the end of the war in the Pacific.
Global War Stage
During the Global War Stage, the national objective will continue to be the
maximum production of needed weapons and supplies, but changes in the program
will result from the obsolescence of particular weapons as better ones are developed
by the enemy or ourselves, from changes in the basic strategy of the war (e.g., less
emphasis on antiaircraft guns as we shift from the defensive to the offensive),
from the filling up of depot stocks throughout the world and the "pipelines" of
the transportation system to the fighting fronts, and from the fact that the basic
equipment for our Army has been manufactured. As General Brehon Somervell,
Commanding General, Army Service Forces, put it: "We have nearly finished our
production of 'capital' equipment and are shifting to a maintenance and replace-
ment basis."'10
On the civilian side, there will also be changes in the program. With the
passage of time, the stocks of many things essential to the health and productive
efficiency of the civilian population have been reduced through constant use. The
time is nearing when we must weigh the risks to the war effort involved in
deferring further production of some essential civilian items.
*The New York Tunes, Jan. 14, 1944, p. 1O, col. 4-
"0 Speech before the Annual Meeting of the United States Chamber of Commerce, Waldorf Astoria,
New York City, April 27, 1943.
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With these facts as to the program in mind, it can be clearly seen that throughout
Stage I, the Global War Stage, materials and manpower will continue to be tight
and there will be no real demobilization. The changes in the program, to be sure,
will pose some problems. Some producers will not be convertible to either new
military or essential civilian requirements; materials and labor shortages will pro-
hibit their transfer to less essential civilian work; and there will, therefore, be
some business casualties.
Pacific War Stage
If the iacific War Stage develops as expected, it will give the first real oppor-
tunity to put the initial stages of industrial demobilization into operation. The
character of the period will be determined by the relationship of the requirements
for the prosecution of the Pacific War to the resources of men, materials, and
machines available. If, for example, to take one extreme, the requirements are so
high that they demand the use of as large a proportion of national resources as is
now demanded, there will, of course, be no industrial demobilization. Stage II
will then simply be a continuation of Stage I. If, on the other hand, the require-
ments are very low, it is possible that, in view of the released resources of materials.
factory facilities, and manpower, resumption of full civilian production would
be possible and would bring forward the events normally anticipated for Stage
III into Stage II.
Military Requirements
The facts and projections by which to estimate just where between these two
extremes the most likely forecast lies are not now available, nor are they likely to be
made publicly available soon. The needed facts ire: (i) estimates of military end-
product requirements by principal categories; (2) estimates of military end-product
inventories transferable from European theaters of operation to use in the Pacific
War; (3) net new production requirements of military end-products for the
Pacific War; (4) net new production requirements translated into materials and
manpower requirements.
The best estimate of our industrial and military leaders would indicate that the
net new production requirements for military end-products after the end of the
War in Europe will be such as to release substantial quantities of materials and
substantial numbers of workers, although these releases will not permit anything
like full resumption of civilian production. Such conditions impose on the govern-
ment the task of selection, of releasing some producers from war work while others
are kept on war work.
Companies to Make Civilian Goods
The selection of the producers to be first released from war production to return
to the manufacture of civilian goods assumes great importance in many minds.
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A head start in returning to civilian production and being in a position to fill
civilian needs is commonly considered to be of very great advantage to companies
as well as communities and even to regions.
Senator O'Mahoney has pointed out in his report to the Senate special committee
on postwar economic planning that: "The people and the businesses of the three
Pacific coast states-and what is true of them applies also to the whole area west
of the Mississippi-foresee that the European war will be finished before the war
in the Pacific is concluded. They foresee that as a result war industry in the west
will be required to continue to operate at high speed while industry in the east
and the north-central states will be free to reorganize and reconvert to peace.
They ask us, therefore, what should be done to prevent a dislocation in the west
following the European phase of the war which they fear will be far greater than
that which has already been endured."' '
The considerations as to which producers should be released first from war
production fall into four categories: (i) the relative efficiency of the particular
concern in producing the war items; (2) efficiency in the use of national resources;
(3) consistency with the desired economic pattern for the future; and (4) con-
sistency with concepts of competitive "fairness."
Relative Efficiency of Concern
There are several possible measures of the relative efficiency of different pro.
ducers which might be used, either separately or in combination. The first measure
is the price at which the concern is willing to continue production of the war item.
The second measure is the cost of production, while the third and fourth measures
are the material use per unit of output and the manpower use per unit of output.
Basing decisions on such measures as these would tend to hold down the cost
of war production to the Government and would ordinarily provide for the maxi-
mum output of war goods in the least possible time. The procurement agencies
naturally tend to emphasize these considerations.' 2
If our war production facilities were evenly distributed throughout the country
in a manner paralleling the distribution of available manpower, or if there were
complete mobility in manpower, basing decisions on the relative efficiency of
the particular concern in the use of manpower would automatically result in the
maximum efficiency in the use of our manpower resources as a whole. Unfor-
tunately, however, neither of these conditions prevails. Our war production facilities
are not scattered evenly throughout the country in accordance with available man-
power, and manpower is not entirely mobile. Therefore, the second set of con-
siderations is not always consistent with the first set.
" SEN. Doc. No. io6, 78th Cong., ist Sess. (1943) 4.
12 See statements in Procurement Regulation 15 of the War Department, in which the considerations
governing the selection of contracts to be terminated are set forth.
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Efficiency in Use of National Resources
As has been repeatedly pointed out, our national manpower shortage problem
is still essentially a local problem. Because of the concentration of war production
facilities in particular regions and communities, those areas are faced with vexin,
difficulties and problems, while at the same time in many other areas there is under-
employment or employment on relatively unessential activities beyond the basic need
for them. Thus, the issue must frequently be raised with respect to decisions as to
termination whether the release of a producer highly efficient in the use of man-
power in an area of acute labor shortage will not result in an over-all gain in the
program as compared with the release 'of a producer less efficient in the use of
manpower in an area of labor surplus.
The same observation is applicable, though with somewhat less force because
of the relative acuteness of the manpower situation, to the use of other national
resources, notably transportation. In some cases selection of producers to be con-
tinued in war production must rest on the fact that their location imposes a lesser
burden on strategic transportation facilities than does any other available location.
The first two considerations are essentially war problems. Their importance
will continue to be very great so long as the maximum war production remains
the single goal. They can, therefore, be expected to control decisions very largely
throughout the Global War Stage and into the Pacific War Stage. But in the
Pacific War Stage the last two considerations will assume more and more im-
portance.
Consistency with Economic Pattern for the Future
During the early days of the defense program and while war production was
getting its start toward its present overwhelming levels, there was a great deal of
discussion of how and to what extent the defense and war programs could be made
to contribute to various long-run economic objectives. Among the long-run eco-
nomic objectives were the desire to decentralize industry from the industrial north-
east into the south and west and the desire to develop industrial activity in rela-
tively smaller communities, as compared with the metropolitan areas.
In the minds of some government officials and businessmen, the first objective
was pointed toward industrial self-sufficiency for the several regions in the south
and west. At the same time, other groups were most concerned that the defense
and war programs should serve to eliminate stranded populations by replacing the
dead or dying activity with other activities holding promise of vigorous life for
these communities in the future. These groups, of course, were also concerned
that the war programs should not in turn create other stranded communities.
These considerations can be counted upon to come to the front almost imme-
diately and again during the Pacific War Stage of military operations. It will
be strongly advocated that strenuous efforts be made to prevent large groups of
people now assembled to work in specially constructed war plants in what once
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were small and out-of-the-way communities from being left in those communities
without the prospect for productive employment.
Curiously enough, exactly opposite policies will be advocated by people having
the objective of preventing general unemployment for the country as a whole. It
will be argued that production in such plants should be terminated early so that
the employees will have a head start in seeking employment elsewhere, and so that
the managements of plants converting to non-war production can put their pro-
grams into operation more quickly. This will be countered by the argument that
these specialized war plants should be the last released from war production to
provide the maximum employment while permitting the plants which can most
easily resume civilian production to do so.
There is the danger of course that certain groups will bring pressure to keep
war plants in production longer than is necessary from a military point of view
in order to prevent unemployment. Strikes to protest cutting down Government
orders are an indication of this viewpoint. No doubt arguments for continued pro-
duction will be based on the alleged need for large reserves of newest equipment
but any production of munitions based on anything but military necessity as de-
termined by our General Staff sections must be discarded.
Considerations Regarding Competitive Position
During the period of industrial mobilization, while the shift from full peace-
time production to a maximum war production effort was in process, there was
continuous concern about the "fairness" of the treatment accorded different com-
petitors. There was much talk about "taking time out for the war." There was
a general belief that every effort should be made to preserve the relative competi-
tive position of each company in an industry, and that the war should not be used
to change the competitive relationships.
In spite of efforts to do so, these desires could not be fully met. As the war
has gone on, it has become dearer and clearer that all sorts of changes have and
are taking place in the relative position of firms within industries and of one
industry relative to another. In some measure at least it is recognition of these facts
that gives the force to the concern about the "head start" in the return to the
civilian market. It is therefore not difficult to predict that during the industrial
demobilization period there will be even more concentration on the problems of
"fairness" than there was during the period of industrial mobilization.
Mr. Donald M. Nelson, Chairman of the War Production Board, has said
repeatedly that American industry and the American people will do anything if
they are convinced that it is necessary and if they are convinced that it is fairly
handled. During the Pacific War Stage, American industry and the American
people will look with acute attention at the actions taken in the light of their
"fairness."
In his report to the Senate committee on postwar economic policy and planning
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Senator O'Mahoney said: "When the War Production Board and its predecessors
were first established, efforts were made to devise a system whereby appeals could
be taken from the priority and allocation orders of the Government managers. None
of these efforts succeeded because it was believed that it would be better to run
the risk of injustice than to permit the flow of materials to war industry to be
interrupted. The people accepted for the most part regimentation by the war
managers because they knew that victory in the war was the essential objective
without which nothing else would be of value. But in the reconversion period we
cannot be so acquiescent. The War Production Board cannot be permitted to en-
force its system of quotas and priorities and limitation orders without the establish-
ment of an over-all appeals board which shall prevent the exercise of this vast power
to deprive any business, any State, any community of the materials it needs for
the civilian economy."
The observations in this quotation in regard to the importance of "fairness"
in the administration of the priority power apply with equal force to the other
instruments for governmental guiding of demobilization, such as the administra-
ion of the contract power, the manner of conducting contract termination or can-
cellation, and the speed with which claims are paid in whole or at least in part.
Problems of Competitive Position
Now let us examine some of the questions which will arise under the major
heading "Competitive Position."
(i) Should large concerns or small concerns in an industry be released first?
The Congress has set forth a national policy that small enterprises in this country
shall be encouraged to the utmost extent possible. There have been repeated and
substantial efforts to bring the smaller concerns more fully into the war production
program. The Smaller War Plants Corporation has made notable attempts to bring
this about. In demobilization an obvious way to accord a preference to smaller
enterprises during the transition period would be to make sure that if any enter-
prises are given a head start in the production of civilian goods they are the smaller
enterprises.
(2) Should the firm converted to the production of a new item or the regular
producer be released first? In a number of cases the needs of the war program
have caused manufacturers to be converted to the production of items which they
have never made before. Should the regular producers of those items be preferred,
as far as time of release is concerned, to these converted producers, many of whom
with new equipment can produce the product cheaper than the old line companies
which have obsolete and worn equipment?
(3) Should newcomers to an industry with a greatly improved product be
released before or as soon as the regular producers in the industry? There are
already a number of cases where greatly improved products have resulted from the
technical research work during th last two or three years. In many of these
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cases the newcomers will demand at least equal treatment with the established
producers so far as the allocation of materials and the release from war produc-
tion are concerned. There is also the desirability from the standpoint of con-
sumers that improved products be permitted to reach them as rapidly as possible.
Immediate introduction of these improved products, however, might create uncer-
tainty in the market for all producers of similar items and might thereby so affect
sales possibilities that production and therefore employment would be reduced
during the most critical part of the transition period.
As a result of the scarcity of materials there has been a great deal of substitu-
tion of less desirable materials and reduction in quality in the products manufac-
tured for the civilian market. These substitute products are accepted reluctantly by
the American people only because there is no prospect of securing anything better.
Manufacturers and distributors are much alarmed at the losses which they will face
on existing stocks of these products as soon as even small quantities of standard
products are available.
(4) Should producers specializing in high quality and price or those specializing
in low quality and price be released first? In many industries there are clearly
defined divisions, with some manufacturers making a relatively high-quality prod-
uct and selling at relatively high prices and others concentrating on the lower
quality and price fields. Frequently the high-priced quality manufacturers are
further distinguished from the others in that they sell under well-established trade-
marks and use extensive national advertising to promote their products, while the
others sell through large volume retailers, often under the brand names of the
retailers.
A substantial headstart for either group would have important repercussions,
not only to the manufacturers but also throughout the trade channels. It would.
be, for instance, a highly significant competitive development if the manufacturers
of refrigerators to be sold under the Sears Roebuck and Montgomery Ward names
were released before those manufactured for sale under well-known trade names,
and similarly if the reverse action were taken.
Many Variations of Competitive Issues
In actual practice many variations of these competitive questions will develop.
Not all of them will apply in the case of any particular industry or product. In
many industries and products there will be all sorts of combinations of these ques-
tions. During the total war stage these questions will not be of major importance,
although they will pose vexing difficulties to those who have to decide which
manufacturers will make the relatively small quantities of essential goods neces-
sary for the health and productive efficiency of the civilian population.' s
a' With the increase in marriages and the frequent shifts of servicemen and their wives to com-
munities where the laundry problem is acute there has been a heavy demand for electric irons which
have not been obtainable. When raw materials became available the WPB was willing to permit
their manufacture. The large companies which made electric irons before the war insisted that it
was their job and that they should not be penalized because they were devoting their facilities to war
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In the Pacific War Stage these and similar questions will occupy a place of
increasing importance. In some instances companies will decide that they do wish
to continue to manufacture munitions as long as possible, and it may be that such
decisions will so reduce the number of concerns which wish to engage in civilian
production that all who desire to may be permitted to do so.
It is important that policies in regard to the questions in these various cate-
gories bearing on the release of particular concerns from war production should
be formulated in advance and that administrative organizations and procedures
should be developed to put the policies into effect. In particular, it is important
that the policies developed to govern the release of companies by contract termina-
tion or cancellation should go hand in hand with the policies governing the lifting
of the prohibitions on production of civilian items and the controls directing the
flow of raw materials.
Establishing General Policies
The President has appointed Bernard Baruch to work out with James Byrnes,
Director of the Office of War Mobilization, contract termination and reconversion
policies looking eventually to demobilization. It appears likely that the work of
actually putting these policies into effect will fall to the lot of the WPB. Perhaps
the name of the agency and some of the personalities will change as has happened
several times in the past, but the powers given Maury Maverick of the Smaller War
Plants Corporation working under WPB with the Office of Civilian Requirements
would indicate the strong probability of such future developments.
In shaping these policies and putting them into operation, other agencies will
undoubtedly have an influence, particularly in regard to control of price.
Congress too will have its say, for there are no less than four committees in the
House and four committees in the Senate concerned directly with the war adjust-
ment problems of transition and demobilization. Numerous bills have been intro-
duced and more will follow, but it is to be hoped that in the process of sifting
out the wheat from the chaff, Congress will not wait to draw up one over-all bill
that will be cumbersome, cause delay, and in fact be out of date almost before being
passed, but will pass needed legislation in detail as the situation requires.
Recognition of the increasing importance of taxes and the need for permitting
wartime reserves merits Congressional action to insure that companies which have
made the transition to war production can make the second transition to civilian
production. A tax program that can be carried in stabilized industry may prove a
difficult stumbling block in a transition period.' 4
production. The small companies, many of which had been unable to participate in war production,
demanded that the job be given to them. As a compromise the small companies were permitted
to make the irons which were stamped with the trademarks of the large companies and distributed
through regular retail channels.
14 See J. KEITr BtrrrS, WAR PROFITS TAXATION AND SPECIAL WARTIME REsERvEs (Harvard Gradu-
ate School of Business Administration, Business Research Studies No. 30, January 1944).
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In shaping policies various government agencies will have an influence. For
example, Stabilization Director Fred M. Vinson issued a directive on November i6,
1943, establishing a price formula for low-priced essential consumer goods. This
formula permitted an increase in prices of scarce articles, but limited the new ceiling
for manufacturers whose profits were not more than double those of the 1936-
1939 period to the cost of producing the item plus a profit not to exceed 2% before
taxes. For manufacturers whose profits were more than double those of the base
period, the new ceiling could not exceed the unit cost.
On January 29, 1943, Mr. Vinson stated that the directive was intended to apply
only to manufacturers who produced essential civilian goods under mandatory
orders of the WPB; also, that it would only apply to textiles and apparel. Prob-
lems arising in connection with other consumer goods where price adjustments were
involved were to be submitted to the OES for treatment on an individual basis-
which was consistent with that provided for textiles and apparel.
By February 1, 1944, industrial reconversion had raised the question as to what
prices the OES would permit on durable goods when production was started. For
example, the VvPB' 5 released materials to manufacture 2,oooooo flat irons; industry,
however, did not know how this output would be priced. Many concerns stressed
that unit costs were higher, when only a limited production was permitted, because
of higher fixed charges as well as material costs.
In a change affecting the entire nation every branch of the government will
have a part and most certainly a spokesman who often will not be in accord with
the methods advocated by other agencies. If we can keep in mind that we live
in a democracy, not a dictatorship, and that free speech, especially in an election
year, is one of our most prized rights, and that we have seldom had a shortage of
spokesmen, we should not be too badly confused by the working of the democratic
process.
Baruch Report
The report prepared by Bernard M. Baruch and his assistant, John Hancock,
was released to the public on February 1g, 1944. The Baruch staff with the assist-
ance of the Joint Contract Termination Board with the representatives of six major
procurement agencies developed the main points of a far-reaching program and
will continue to work to perfect the plan and to help solve the problems that will
arise in its operation. In annunciating Government policies, on contract termination
this report emphasizes five main points:
(i) The plan provides for prompt payment of ioo% of the amount due on a
claim as nearly as that figure can be ascertained. This includes ioo% payment
for all completed articles, immediate payment for factual items such as direct
labor and materials on incompleted items, and immediate ioo% payment of
" The WPB favored the use of production quotas based upon past production records in a base
period such as 1936-1940 in allocating an output of 123,000 trucks among 25 companies.
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settlements with subcontractors. Where subcontractors are threatened with losses
through the fault or insolvency of a higher contractor, direct settlements of con-
tracts may be made by procurement agencies at their discretion. After 30 days
interest will be paid at an annual rate of 2'A % on the unpaid part of claims until
date of final settlement.
(2) There is provided a simple system of termination loans employing credit
facilities of commercial banks. These loans will have partial Government guaran-
tees and will be available to both prime and subcontractors. It is planned to merge
V loans for war production and VT loans for war production and termination
with the new T loans when the latter become available.
(3) Wherever private financing is not available, direct government loans may be
made to contractors unable to obtain bank'loans within thirty days. The procur-
ing agency extending such loans will follow substantially the same procedure as
in the case of a partially guaranteed loan of a commercial bank and the interest
rate will also be similar.
(4) Final settlement of claims will be made by negotiations between the con-
tractors and the contracting agencies. Safeguards developed in making contracts
will be used in uninaking of contracts.
(5) The interest of the Government will be protected by continuing audits after
settlement for detection of fraud and correction of mathematical mistakes. The
Comptroller General and the Attorney General are to be added to the Joint Con-
tract Termination Board but the review powers of the Comptroller General are
to be limited to cases of fraud. Government negotiators will keep full records
of the basis of settlement and contractors must keep their records for at least three
years after the settlement date.
The Baruch report recommends disposal of surplus war property as rapidly as
possible without upsetting normal trade in industry. A board will lay down the
policies of the four agencies charged with the disposal of surplus property. (i) The
Treasury Procurement Division will direct the disposal of all consumer goods. (2)
The R. F. C. will dispose of capital and producer goods as well as all types of indus-
trial property. (3) The Maritime Commission will have charge of the disposal
of all ships, yards, and maritime property. (4) The Food Administrator will handle
the disposition of all surplus food.
In the main, the disposal of plants will be handled on an industry-wide basis
Studies will be made for subdividing the largest units, leasing and establishing credit
arrangements to assure that small companies are given opportunities which might
otherwise not be available to them.
Like the report of Senator George's post-war planning committee, released a
week earlier, the Baruch report follows the same general principles. Private
initiative and resourcefulness, rather than Government regulations, are the surest
road to a successful transition. Industry must have available capital which can be
provided by prompt settlement of contract claims and the making of loans where
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necessary. The disposal of surplus property must be handled in such a way as
not to upset trade or industry, and the Government must not compete with private
enterprise.
Putting Policies into Operation
Contracting officers of the Army, Navy, and Maritime Commission have been
and will probably continue to be the individuals who terminate contracts and
authorize settlements. One of the first steps necessary to insure prompt action is
legislation to relieve contracting officers of personal liability in the absence of
fraud or bad faith. If he is not given such protection from the General Account-
ing Office, and if accounts of any disbursing officer acting in good faith are held
up months or even years after the event, we may rest assured that-contracting
officers will be slow to act regardless of how much injury to business and increased
unemployment results from the delay. No contracting officer can be expected to
act efficiently if payment for disallowed items paid in good faith are exacted from his
salary while his wife and children go without the things they need and want.
Payment of just claims upon termination of a contract must be prompt if in-
dustry is to be in a position to return to civilian production. Immediate payment
of subcontractors is particularly important, for although large companies such as
General Electric Company may sometimes be subcontractors, in the main this class
represents smaller companies which should not be placed in jeopardy by delays in
payments when a war contract entered in good faith is terminated. The delays in
the payments to Baldwin Locomotive Company and International Harvester Com-
pany, together with their several hundred subcontractors, for instance, damage not
only the companies involved, but also the morale of managements and stockholders
of other companies.
Prompt payment does not require that the full value of claims as submitted by
the contractor must be paid without at least reasonable checking by contracting
officers supported in their work by a necessary staff of assistants. Businessmen have
sometimes submitted bids at a loss to obtain a contract but claims submitted when
a contract is terminated have seldom been modest. Some examples are available that
show businessmen have not been averse to putting in a larger claim than could be
substantiated for trading purposes. An able contracting officer can usually detect
such cases and reach an agreement on the amount of the real claim.
Where the contracting officer and the company are not in accord, machinery
must be set up" for boards of appeal for the prompt handling of cases. Similarly,
an appeals organization, preferably local in character, should be instituted for the
relief of subcontractors who fail to secure prompt and equitable treatment of their
claims. Here again prompt decision and settlement are of paramount importance.
The success of renegotiation boards in deciding cases should indicate a type of
procedure that is effective. And finally cburts are available in cases of fraud to
protect the public interest; the many should not suffer for the possible derelictions
of a few.
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Importance of Business Leadership
Government planning, assistance, and leadership in the period of wartime transi-
tion is important, but the planning and positive action of business leaders indi-
vidually and in groups are the decisive factors. It was this planning and positive
action that produced the weapons that will enable the United Nations to break the
onslaught and eventually to defeat the Axis hordes. It is this same planning that
will determine the success of the return to peace.
Business and labor leaders must plan for their own concerns and communities,
for in the flexibility of positive action by many individuals to meet local and regional
conditions lies the real strength of transition and demobilization. Of even greater
moral responsibility than the obligations to the widows, small businessmen, laborers,
and few men of wealth who constitute the great body of stockholders is the obli-
gation to the returning serviceman. Of far greater importance than the cheering
crowds, the separation pay, and the victory medals of a grateful Government to the
ex-soldier, sailor, or marine is the voice of the American businessman "Young man,
you have got a job."
